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Introduction
1 Many thanks to Annika Björkdahl, Kristine Höglund, the International Development Department at the University of Birmingham (in particular Nicolas LeMay-Hébert, Jonathan Fisher and Paul Jackson) and two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper. It can be said that Bosnia represents one of the more typical case studies in the field of peacebuilding, not only because it is referred to as such in the literature, but also quite visibly in the light of the heavy involvement of a set of international actors in the micropolitics and processes of governance in the country. The latter are often assumed to be conflict-prone and in need of international assistance to lead to peace at all societal levels. Against this background, one may wonder about the extent to which South Africa can be considered a peacebuilding case at all, given that for many, development issues appear to be more pressing than peacebuilding in the narrow sense. In South Africa, however, issues of development, poverty, discrimination, social justice and criminality are the markers through which social engagement is typically characterised. Those issues represent the discursive frameworks through which peace-related engagement is framed in the country.
Looking at the very recent history of South Africa, it does become evident that discussions about a peaceful future for the country are closely linked to the (in)ability to include the poor and marginalised with political debates and, more generally, the ways in which issues of social justice are addressed. In this context, people most affected by these issues emphasised that material deprivation is likely to lead to criminality, violence and continued unrest. 
Friction between 'Imagined Communities'
To illustrate the fluid boundaries at which frictions emerge, we need to revisit suggests, but we have to account for friction as a process of local just as much as global connectedness, in the light of the energy that is produced through local-global encounters.
Vertical frictions and Horizontalisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Peacebuilding in Bosnia 
17
What the following section will show is the gradual emergence and solidification of horizontal imagined communities and the resulting development of vertical frictions in BiH. As a result, actors tend to articulate and channel their needs horizontally. Vertical links do exist, but tend to be scarce and often blocked. Again, this is not an attempt to essentialise the emergence of communities, but rather to outline some tendencies through which they have become integrated internally.
The International Community
Looking at the international community, it can be said that it is often perceived as one group, both locally and from within that community. Indeed, although different international actors pursue a variety of agendas, it seems that the EU has gradually been taking over the role of the agenda-setter. standards of social inclusion and cooperation. 19 The EU itself also seems to base its actions on a cooperative way of working with other international actors in the country. A political advisor to the EU Delegation to Bosnia-Herzegovina quoted the process of passing civil service laws in 2003, which she considered an efficient process, given the support the EU received from the OHR. 20 Given that, as a general rule, the process of passing laws in BiH can take years due to the complex powersharing arrangements, the fact that those civil service laws consolidated within only a few months was considered a success. However, the imagination of international actors as an almost friction-free community of actors is not just a product of those institutional forms of cooperation, but also of the ways in which the international community is portrayed locally. When speaking about the international community in everyday life discourses, people do not tend to differentiate between different agencies. 21 There is a more general notion of the group of "internationals", a term which comes with heavy baggage as a result of the perceived failure of any international actors to end the violence before the end of violence in 1995. Not least as a result of that failure, international actors are perceived as distant from ordinary people's lives, while the latter picture the former as distant and, as with all that is distant, as more or less homogeneous. This perceived detachment is closely linked to a rather sceptical view of international peacebuilding more generally. A political advisor to the EU Delegation himself pointed to the Delegation's awareness of a growing animosity towards EU on the ground. 22 In that sense, there are not many attempts by local actors to break through the shell of international agency, while the latter remains in a more or less isolated arena, with its own culture in friction with the surrounding 'local' environment.
The Political Class
These centripetal forces also play out in the political class -perhaps surprisingly against the background that one expects to deal with a deeply ethnically segregated landscape shaped by ethnicised political communities. However, several meetings in parliament with politicians from competing political parties reflected a Similarly, the EU has a strong interest in having one single interlocutor, both from the perspective of the local Delegation as well as from Brussels. 25 In that sense, EU accession presupposes a friction-free political landscape, coherent local structures and, to a certain extent, requires that landscape to be integrative. 26 The European Parliament's recent progress report on BiH indeed confirms the requirement for a single (rather than divided) country to enter the EU. 27 This in turn implies the requirement to overcome frictions between different political parties and their sociogeographical divisions. This is of course not to say that the political class is free from horizontal frictions. To the contrary, the difficulties in forming a government after the 2010 elections reflected the extent to which divisions shape Bosnia's political landscape. It took fourteen months for political parties to agree on the formation of a government, which did in fact block the state considerably. However, Bosnians from a variety of backgrounds, and particularly in the Federation, would often tell me that "our politicians are all the same", "they are all corrupt" and "I do not want to get involved with those people". People tend to see politicians as mutual allies who are all equally corrupt and not interested in the welfare of Bosnian citizens.
Some politicians seem to be aware of this problem, admitting that they cannot fulfil citizens' expectations 28 and that there is a lack of citizens' engagement with public debates. 29 To a large extent, this coincides with the view of many international Europe more specifically, arguing that, since societal interests in many Eastern
European countries have historically been subordinated to the state, the concept of civil society in that region is lacking in substantial value. 40 Civil society, despite its attempts to distance itself from donor regulations, is often perceived as a donor instrument and are thus situated in close relation to the imagined community of international actors in BiH. They do not tend to be viewed as a locally grown set of actors, nor as a tool through which Bosnians would tend to make their voices heard. 41 A staff member of the Nansen Dialogue Centre in Mostar, for instance, suggested that as an NGO, it is sometimes difficult to make a difference as problems are deeply rooted in communities. 42 This statement in turn implies a detachment of the NGO sphere from local communities and points to the problems NGOs face when attempting to translate local grievances into donor-attractive policies.
Not only are there frictions between them and local communities, but partly also with international actors. In a number of cases have civil society actors made efforts to achieve their own goals as detached from what the international community expects. 43 Just to quote one specific example: the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, based in Sarajevo, has emphasised the desire to develop its own human rights initiatives as opposed to building on the project outlines as international actors propose them. 44 Again, this example reflects the extent to which civil society actors are, partly intentionally, partly by necessity, focused on their own community rather than on the surrounding communities. Their work is largely de-politicised and therefore isolated from the ethnic divisions that may otherwise divide them horizontally. 45 This focus creates a certain degree of stability within those circles, while at the same time perpetuating frictional peacebuilding between local, state, NGO and international communities.
The local population
Similar dynamics are at play in the ways in which the local population are viewed and imagined externally. There seems to be a tendency among international actors to refer to Bosnians, sometimes as one, but mostly as one or three local homogenous groups. The Dayton Peace Agreement itself reflects the assumption that the three ethnic majority groups, i.e. Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, can be represented as a more or less unitary group, thus setting the tone for how local society is portrayed politically. Again, we can observe tendencies for local communities to be represented as part of one community. This is linked to the aim of many international agencies to reconcile horizontal divides rather than addressing vertical frictions. The World Bank, for instance, praises itself for achieving unified licence plates across the country, thus allowing for a greater freedom of movement. 46 Along similar lines, the EU is interested in clear boundaries around imagined communities, basing its approaches to policy-making on a triangle between the EU -local authorities -local civil society. beyond their institutional context. 49 The perception that the international community remains distant from local experiences can be said to be particularly strong outside Sarajevo, the capital city. In Banja Luka, which is more than six hours by bus from Sarajevo, people described the extent to which they felt excluded and distanced from the politics of the international community. 50 Given that most international organisations have their headquarters in the capital city (with a few exceptions such as the OHR or the OSCE who do operate beyond Sarajevo), connections between nonmetropolitan actors and international actors remain a rarity and geographical frictions are common. This is, however, not to say that there are no vertical connections whatsoever.
Gariwo, for instance, an NGO working for civil courage, has organised meetings between students and international ambassadors, aiming to establish links of communication between those individuals. 51 At the same time, those bridges can only be found sporadically, failing to reach across wide societal and political sectors.
International peacebuilding seems to have reinforced rather than challenged the horizontalisation of political communities.
Against this background, the following section will contrast the situation in BiH with the ways in which vertical communities are formed and imagined in South Africa.
Horizontal frictions and Verticalisation in South Africa
While the example of BiH reflects deeply engrained vertical lines of friction, the following section will present the case of South Africa as a community landscape, not exclusively, but predominantly shaped by horizontal frictions and vertical cooperation. This has to be seen in the context of South Africa's recent history and particularly the era of apartheid and the struggle against it, both deeply engrained in the living memory of South Africans. pointed out that "we all know each other. We were part of the same struggle, on either side". 55 In that sense, the fact that South African history is shaped by a multitude of cleavages other than along lines of political hierarchy has contributed to the emergence of constantly changing lines of friction along a number of alternative lines, including class, geographical location, skin colour and so forth. The frictions between the formerly governing white elites and the oppression of the black majority can be said to have been transformative, resulting in violent and non-violent forms of resistance and finally resulting in the overthrow of the apartheid system in 1994.
Selective vertical cooperation
In the process of transition to democracy, which, as opposed to the case of Bosnia, resulted from internal pressures, the presence of international actors has been rather sporadic, and a real sense of an 'international community' has not really developed until today. Instead, most international actors present in the country engage in their very own agendas without necessarily linking them to each other. The World Bank, for instance, focuses on research on poverty and inequality of opportunity, 56 while the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is engaged in the fields of governance, human rights, environmental sustainability, poverty reduction, HIV and crisis management. 57 The EU itself has only a rather limited role, particularly in comparison with its involvement in BiH, and tends to focus on trade as well as partnership agreements on a contractual basis.
Due to this rather lose connection between different agencies, South African institutions have started to engage with international donors according to their needs and perhaps more selectively than in BiH. This allows for a tough, but flexible approach to funding and project cooperation and is useful for local agencies as they can thus circumvent conditionalities they would otherwise be confronted with. Conflict Resolution addresses a large target audience, including local councillors, church leaders, schools and community leaders. 60 The inclusion of different sets of actors as well as the attempt to establish structures of accountability between them can in turn be said to strengthen vertical links and to create vertical imagined communities -at least on a project-base, if not beyond. Imagined communities thus seem to be common, sporadic, flexible and needs-based.
Horizontal frictions
One of the main reasons why vertical links seem more likely than in BiH is the fact that there are more horizontal frictions and divisions. The divisions within government itself are by no means a new phenomenon, 61 As one of the former organisers explained, there was much political activism involved. 64 He also pointed to the fragmentation of government, suggesting that the associated "political confusion" reflects "the true sense of who we are". 65 In that respect, the dissatisfaction with the government and its internal divisions have led to attempts to challenge the ANC from inside, in terms of building on those divisions to achieve political change. 66 Along similar lines, the township "Malawi Town" is very politicised, fighting for their rights by challenging political strategies openly. 67 Although conditions of the township seem very adverse regarding political activism due to its geographical marginalisation as well as the lack of public transport to take people to political venues (such as Town Hall), local leaders have repeatedly sought conversation with the local political elites. 68 This also holds true for the Khulumani Support Group, making the grievances of those marginalised from the truth and reconciliation processes heard to politicians. 69 It becomes obvious that these strategies only work in a political landscape in which actors are vertically linked and in communication with each other -in whichever way. This can also be considered one of the reasons for which Abigail's Women's Movement was able to start its engagement with the most marginalised sections of the township Khayelitsha from nothing, while eventually obtaining the support of the Ministry of Social Development. 70 What started as a few women caring for elderly and handicapped people could thus become a caring centre. 71 At the same time, these cross-level connections and thus emerging sporadic vertical imagined communities can to a certain extent also be found in the work done by museums. The latter seem to perceive an increasing interest in their work on the part of politicians. The Iziko Slave Lodge is one example where the museum pointed to the issue of empowerment of the Khoi (a South African ethnic group), which was thereafter integrated with the political agenda on a nation-wide basis. 72 In a similar vein, the Gender Equity Unit at the University of the Western Cape has started to engage in political activism beyond its direct mandate at the university. Through their submissions to the government, the unit has, according to its director, impacted upon the legal status of women as well as their rights and equality. 73 grassroots level and tries to make their findings heard to policy-makers. 77 As researchers in the institution highlighted, there have indeed been policy-relevant reforms in the field of health as a result of the dialogue between the institute and policy-makers. 78 Generally, compared to the horizontalised landscape of imagined communities in BiH, South Africa seems to have stronger links between researchers and policy-makers. 79 Although not friction-free, it can be said that there is a clear awareness of grassroots demands towards the government, including the most pressing issues such as poverty, unemployment and so forth, 80 not least as a result of the work of 'translators' as outlined above.
Verticality: Limiting and Empowering
At the same time, the situation must not be glorified as the fragmentation of horizontal political landscapes equally reflects divisions along the lines of ethnicity, class and so forth. The vertical orientation of politics must also be seen in the context of South Africa's patrimonial heritage 81 , which favours vertical structures of accountability in exchange for votes and includes structures of clientelism at its base.
As a township elder pointed out, politicians mainly enter in contact with the shack dwellers in his community before elections are due. 82 has been subject to critiques questioning its lack of clarity of its findings, 84 its ambiguous use of the concept of reconciliation 85 its limits in terms of wider impact, 86 its inability to deliver reparations to most people adversely affected by apartheid policies 87 , as well as its tendencies to over-privilege white and previously powerful people. 88 At the same time, the TRC may have laid the institutional grounding for Bosnian socio-political life presents itself as primarily horizontally stratified, which may produce more stability in the political system. However, this stability can be considered an uncomfortable and often exclusive stalemate for many citizens who are not represented in the political networks that are politically influential. If peacebuilding actors are to understand not only the local context in which they operate, but also the ways in which their own role impacts upon the mutual relationships between different actors, the directionality and quality of frictions in the socio-political landscape are key to understanding the dynamics and transformative impacts of intervention.
